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I. ABSTRACT
Several prominent scholars use results from social choice theory to
conclude that legislative intent is meaningless. We disagree. We support
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our argument by showing that the conclusions in question are based on
misapplications of the theory. Some of the conclusions in question are
based on Arrow's famous General Possibility Theorem. We identify a
substantial chasm between what Arrow proves and what others claim in
his name. Other conclusions come from a failure to realize that applying
social choice theory to questions of legislative intent entails accepting
assumptions such as "legislators are omniscient" and "legislators have
infinite resources for changing law and policy." We demonstrate that
adding more realistic assumptions to models of social choice theory
yields very different theoretical results-including ones that allow for
meaningful inferences about legislative intent. In all of the cases we
describe, important aspects of social choice theory were lost in the
translation from abstract formalisms to real political and legal domains.
When properly understood, social choice theory is insufficient to negate
legislative intent.
II. INTRODUCTION
Is it impossible for a court to discern a legislature's intent when it
attempts to interpret vague or ambiguous statutes? The answer to this
question is the topic of an important and long-standing debate in legal
scholarship.' Some participants in this debate advise courts to seek out
the legislative intent that motivated the statute and apply it to the new
circumstance at hand. Others reject this advice, arguing that legislative
intent cannot exist.
A set of abstract formal models of collective decision-making plays an
important role in this debate. Here, we evaluate arguments against
legislative intent that are based on these models. The models come from
a branch of cooperative game theory called social choice theory.2
Cooperative game theory uses clearly stated assumptions and formal
logic to clarify relationships between individual preferences and
collective choices. It is the oldest brand of game theory. Unlike the kind
of game theory (non-cooperative) used by most social scientists today,
cooperative game theory does not allow individual actors to adapt
1. See, e.g., WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994);
Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Theories of Law and Statutory Interpretation,
in WHAT STATUTES MEAN (Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez eds., 2004).
2. In a companion paper, Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Can
Legislative Records Aid Statutory Interpretation? Inference, Credibility, and Collective
Intent in the United States Congress, in WHAT STATUTES MEAN (Mathew D. McCubbins
& Daniel B. Rodriguez eds., 2004), we focus on a second class of models cited in these
arguments: the branch of non-cooperative game theory that examines legislative decision
making.
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strategically to their environment. It also ignores the time and effort
required to make and implement collective decisions. We will show that
factors such as these make cooperative game theory a weak and
unreliable foundation for arguments against legislative intent.
While cooperative game theory is seen less frequently at the cutting
edge of social science today, its legacy is of fundamental importance.
The branch known as social choice theory remains particularly influential.
Scholars such as Arrow 3 and Sen4 won Nobel Prizes by using the
method to clarify what groups of people can and cannot accomplish
when choosing collectively.5 Scholars such as McKelvey6 and Schofield7
applied analogous logic to majority decisions in political contexts.8
3. KENNETH, J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
4. Amartya Sen, Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53
(1977); AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970).
5. See, e.g., Peter Bernholz, Logrolling, Arrow Paradox and Cyclical Majorities,
15 PUBLIC CHOICE 87 (1973); Otto A. Davis, Morris H. DeGroot & Melvin Hinich,
Social Preference Orderings and the Majority Rule, 40 ECONOMETRICA 147 (1972);
James M. Enelow & Melvin J. Hinich, On Plott's Pairwise Symmetry Condition for
Majority Rule Equilibrium, 40 PUBLIC CHOICE 317 (1983); Allan Gibbard, Manipulation
of Voting Schemes: A General Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973); Bernard Grofman,
Some Notes on Voting Schemes and the Will of the Majority, 7 PUBLIC CHOICE 65 (1969);
Charles R. Plott, A Notion of Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule, 57
AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1967); Thomas Schwartz, No Minimally Reasonable Collective-
Choice Process Can Be Strategy Proof 3 MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 57 (1982);
Judith Sloss, Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games, 15 PUBLIC CHOICE 19
(1973); Mark A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence
and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions, 13
J. ECON. THEORY 187 (1975).
6. Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and
Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).
7. Norman Schofield, Instability of Simple Dynamic Games, 45 THE REVIEW OF
ECONOMIC STUDIES 574 (1978); Norman Schofield, Generic Instability of Majority Rule,
50 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 695 (1983).
8. See also Linda Cohen, Cyclical Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models, 20 J.
ECON. THEORY 1 (1979); Thomas Schwartz, On the Possibility of Rational Policy
Evaluation, 1 THEORY AND DECISION 89 (1970); and Steven Slutsky, Equilibrium Under
"Majority Voting", 47 ECONOMETRICA 1113 (1979), for related spatial instability results.
In these and other social choice theories, decision-makers are non-strategic. Because
social choice theory's focus is on the aggregative properties of collective choice rules, it
is simpler to portray decision makers as voting for their most preferred alternative even if
they could benefit by misrepresenting their preferences in the act of voting. While social
choice theorists have, in fact, proven that all such rules have strategy-inducing
properties, for example, Allan Gibbard, Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General
Result, 41 ECONOMETRICA 587 (1973); and Mark A. Satterthwaite, Strategy-Proofness
Work such as this reveals the dangers of ascribing desirable normative
attributes such as "the will of the majority" to collective decisions.
Given the main theme of social choice theory's most influential
findings, it is not surprising that learned observers try to apply the results
against legislative intent. Shepsle, for example, uses this literature to
conclude, "Legislative intent is an internally inconsistent, self-contradictory
expression."9 Mashaw concurs: "[T]he outcomes of collective decisions
are probably meaningless because it is impossible to be certain that they
are not simply an artifact of the decision process that has been used."1
In what follows, we examine the connection between social choice
theory and statutory interpretation. We find a considerable gap between
what social choice theory proves and prominent claims made against
legislative intent on the theory's behalf. Important aspects of the theory
are "lost in translation." While oft-cited social choice theory results can
make it difficult to ascribe collective intent to legislative choice, you
must misapply or misread these results to conclude that they render all
such ascriptions meaningless.
Our argument has two parts. First, we focus on claims against legislative
intent that are based on Arrow's General Possibility Theorem. Arrow's
Theorem is a precise mathematical claim supported by a concise proof.
We demonstrate a considerable gap between what Arrow proved and
claims made about his result by participants in the legislative intent
debate. While Arrow's Theorem is an important social scientific finding,
its implication for legislative intent has been exaggerated.
Then, we focus on claims against legislative intent stemming from
social choice theory's majority rule voting results. This work shows that
legislative procedures can greatly affect the relationship between what
individuals want and what groups do. This literature is also misapplied
against legislative intent. Here, the problem lies in authors' failures to
recognize that the theoretical conclusions depend on clearly stated, but
wildly unrealistic, assumptions about human decision making-assumptions
such as "voters are never uncertain about the consequences of their
actions" and "legislators have infinite resources for changing law and
policy." We demonstrate that adding more realistic assumptions yields
and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures
and Social Welfare Functions, 13 J. ECON. THEORY 187 (1975), actually endogenizing
strategic decision making into studies of collective choice falls in the domain of non-
cooperative game theory.
9. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 239, 239 (1992).
10. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public
Law, 65 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 123, 126-27 (1989).
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very different theoretical results-including ones that allow analysts to
draw meaningful inferences about legislative intent.
In sum, we reveal a substantial difference between the conclusions and
proofs of social choice theory and the claims made about them in the
legislative intent debate. We find that more accurate translations are
insufficient to render legislative intent meaningless.
1III. RIGHT ARROW, WRONG TARGET
In their challenge to the applicability of the "legal model," Segal and
Spaeth make the following claim, "It is well established, via mathematical
proofs, that every method of social or collective choice-every arrangement
whereby individual choices are pooled to arrive at a collective
decision-violates at least one principle required for reasonable and fair
democratic decision making."'1
The result to which they are referring is Arrow's General Possibility
Theorem. It is the same result to which Shepsle refers when he claims,
"In the context of majority rule voting, [Arrow's] [T]heorem implies that
it is not possible to guarantee that a majority rule process will yield
coherent choices."' 2 In the article whose subtitle is Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, Shepsle further suggests that this "incoherence will often
take the form of the nonexistence of a collectively 'best' alternative."' 3 The
result is often cited in this vein, with Niemi and Pildes' description being
representative: "Arrow's Theorem reveals that, in theory, public decision
making processes cannot be designed in ways that are fair and that
preclude the possibility that decisions will cycle among various options
(at least under conditions of significant social conflict)."' 4
Such claims have several things in common. They are made against
legislative intent. They are based on Arrow's Theorem. And in all cases,
important parts of the theorem are "lost in translation." Arrow proved
none of these claims.
Arrow's Theorem provides a fundamental insight about collective
11. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATrITUDINAL MODEL 62 (1993).
12. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. LAW & ECON. 239, 241 (1992).
13. Id.
14. Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts,"
and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH.
L. REv. 483, 505 n.88 (1993).
decision making: when at least two individuals use a collective choice
rule (e.g., a voting rule) to choose winners from a set of at least three
alternatives, certain normative goals are impossible to accomplish. But
what did he actually prove impossible?
Arrow's Theorem focuses on potential attributes of a collective choice
rule (a.k.a., a social welfare function; henceforth, a CCR). A CCR
converts a set of individual preference orderings, called a preference
profile P, into a social ordering (e.g., a set of winning choices). 5 For
example, the method of majority decision (hereafter, MMD) is a CCR
where alternative a is chosen over alternative b if and only if more
people prefer a to b than prefer b to a. So, if there are three individuals,
and if the preference profile P consists of the three individual preference
orderings such that "individual 1 prefers x to y to z, individual 2 prefers y
to z to x, and individual 3 prefers x to z to y," then the CCR generates the
outcome x when it is paired against alternatives y and/or z and generates
the outcome y when it is paired against z alone.
Arrow's Theorem lists a set of conditions that a CCR can satisfy (i.e.,
attributes that a CCR can have). One of Arrow's conditions prevents any
individual from being a dictator (i.e., from getting what they want
despite how everyone else votes). Another says that if all people strictly
prefer an alternative x to an alternative y, then if it is possible to have
multiple winners and y is a winner, then x must be a winner, as well.
A third condition, Arrow's condition 1', is important when considering
the Possibility Theorem's applicability to questions of statutory interpretation.
The condition is satisfied if the CCR's domain extends to all logically
possible preference profiles. Sen refers to this condition as "Unrestricted
Domain" and describes it as follows:
[A]s a method of going from individual preferences to social preference, the [CCR]
must be wide enough in scope to work from any logically possible set of
individual orderings. Consider, for example, the Pareto principle as a choice rule.
It gives a perfectly fine social ordering if the individual preferences are
unanimous.. .[b]ut it will not yield a social ordering in other situations.. .This
requirement that the rule must work for every logically possible configuration of
the individual preference orderings we shall call the condition of unrestricted
domain. 
16
Note here that what constitutes a violation of unrestricted domain is
the existence of a single preference profile that when entered as input into a
15. We follow the usual social choice theory convention and assume that
individual preferences are proper orderings in the sense that they are complete, reflexive,
and transitive. For a further explanation, see AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND
SOCIAL WELFARE 1-20 (1970).
16. AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 37 (1970).
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collective choice rule, yields no social decision. Moreover, it is sufficient
that the preference profile be logically possible. As a result, the violating
profile might not be one that we would ever expect to see (e.g., a
logically possible preference profile in a legislative example is one
where each member of a legislature prefers a collective choice outcome
that causes them to endure the worst torture they can imagine over every
other policy they could pass). The condition is considered violated even
though the sole condition-violating preference profile is strictly hypothetical
and other preference profiles-including ones that we might judge both
logically possible and likely to be seen-satisfy the condition.
It is important to note that Arrow's list of conditions is not a complete
list of all the desirable attributes that a method of social choice might
have. It is a very short list. A key advantage of the list, however, is that
Arrow states each condition in stark and clear mathematical terms. As a
result, his theorem is a strong and precise statement about the conditions
under which a CCR can have this particular set of attributes.
While Arrow's list contains a few other conditions, we will not
describe them in detail here as the information we have already provided
is sufficient to support our main conclusion-that Arrow's Theorem is
insufficient to support broad claims against legislative intent.17 The
argument is as follows:
Let M be the number of conditions besides unrestricted domain that
Arrow raised and let N be the number of preference profiles. Seen this
way, Arrow proved the following: a collective choice rule can satisfy all
of the M criteria simultaneously for at most N-1 of the preference
profiles. An alternative way to interpret the result is that we can satisfy
no more than M-1 of Arrow's other criteria simultaneously if we want to
insist on Unrestricted Domain (the CCR yields a social ordering for all N
preference profiles).
This is what Arrow proves.
When the theorem is used in legislative intent debates as the sole basis
for claiming that legislative intent has no meaning, the criterion for
"having meaning" is satisfying Arrow's criteria. One can argue with the
notion that Arrow's criteria are the only possible normative or logical
foundations for legislative intent. However, we argue that even using
these criteria, Arrow's Theorem is insufficient to render legislative intent
17. For readers who are interested in specific details of Arrow's conditions see
KENNETH, J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963) or AMARTYA
SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 41-51 (1970).
meaningless or an oxymoron.
Consider Shepsle's argument. It is clearly presented and we agree with
many of the points he makes. However, we disagree with several claims
he makes about what Arrow's Theorem implies for legislative intent in
the section entitled "The Arrowian Dilemma."18
The words "not possible to guarantee" in the claim "[Arrow's]
Theorem implies that it is not possible to guarantee that a majority rule
process will yield coherent choices"'" reflects the attributes of Arrow's
theorem just described-no CCR can guarantee the satisfaction of all M
conditions for all N preference profiles, but, of course, it may be able to
make such a guarantee for N-1 preference profiles. Shepsle continues:
Put differently, if the preferences of the members of a voting body display a
modicum of diversity, then majority voting need not generate a transitive ordering
of the alternatives available for choice; the alternatives cycle... Indeed,
incoherence will often take the form of the nonexistence of a collectively "best"
alternative. 20
In this claim, coherence and transitivity are equated. Transitivity is
indeed one of the criteria Arrow poses where transitivity is defined as
follows-if x is at least as good as y andy is at least as good as z, then x
is at least as good as z. And it is true that if one wants a CCR to satisfy
all of the other M criteria for all possible preference profiles, then Arrow
proves that transitivity, and by implication coherence, must be sacrificed.
But this kind of argument can be made about any of Arrow's
conditions-not just transitivity. If you want to satisfy all but one of the
M criteria for all possible preference profiles, then the remaining
condition must be sacrificed.
By implication, Arrow's Theorem allows transitivity even in the
presence of preference diversity. If, for example, you sacrifice Universal
Domain (i.e., you require only that Arrow's criteria be satisfied for up to
N-1 preference profiles), then you need not sacrifice any of the M-1 other
criteria to get transitivity. Alternatively, if you must have Universal
18. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It".. Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 239, 241-49 (1992). Subsequent parts of the
section draw on majority rule instability claims from cooperative game theory (which we
address in the next section of this article) and other sources including research on
Congress and non-cooperative game theory (which we address in Arthur Lupia &
Mathew D. McCubbins, When Can Legislative Records Aid Statutory Interpretation?
Inference, Credibility, and Collective Intent in the United States Congress, in WHAT
STATUTES MEAN (Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez eds., 2004)).
19. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 239, 241 (1992).
20. Id.
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Domain, then you can achieve transitivity by giving up just one of the
M-1 other criteria. Thus, Arrow does not prove that a modicum of
preference diversity is sufficient to cause incoherence.
Shepsle then suggests that this "incoherence will often take the form
of the nonexistence of a collectively 'best' alternative."'" However, aside
from the existence claim described above, Arrow's Theorem and proof
22
say nothing about the frequency of intransitivity-or the frequency of
any of his other criteria for that matter. Beyond the fact that for at least
one preference profile per CCR the M criteria will not be satisfied
simultaneously, Arrow's Theorem is completely silent on the matter of
frequency. Beyond existence, Arrow's Theorem offers no insight about
the frequency of incoherence or any other normative violation.
Our disagreement with other claims about Arrow's Theorem and
legislative intent is more nuanced. Recall, for example, Segal and
Spaeth's claim, "It is well established, via mathematical proofs, that
every method of social or collective choice-every arrangement
whereby individual choices are pooled to arrive at a collective
decision-violates at least one principle required for reasonable and fair
democratic decision making."23
What Arrow proves is that no CCR can satisfy the M criteria
simultaneously for more than N-1 of the N possible preference profiles.
In other words, Arrow proves a violation of one of the M criteria for
only a single preference profile per CCR-he does not prove that
violations occur for every preference profile. Indeed, the Theorem and
the proof are silent about how many such violating profiles there may
be. Moreover, it is trivial to create examples where for a large set of
CCR's and a large number of preference profiles, all M criteria are
satisfied (e.g., When there are hundreds of legislators and dozens of
alternatives, the number of logically possible preference profiles can be
in the millions. Arrow's Theorem allows all M criteria to be satisfied for
all but one of these profiles).
In other words, Arrow's Theorem is sufficient to prove Segal and
Spaeth's claim only if we categorize each of Arrow's conditions,
including Unrestricted Domain, as a "principle required for reasonable
21. Id. (emphais added).
22. KENNETH, J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 97-100 (2d ed.
1963).
23. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITuDINAL
MODEL 62 (1993).
and fair democratic decision making."24 If, however, we consider "fair
and reasonable" CCR's that satisfy Arrow's M criteria up to N-1
logically possible preference profiles, or if we agree to restrict attention
to preference profiles that are both "logically possible" and "have a
greater than zero chance of being observed given what we know about
individual preferences," then the Theorem is insufficient to support the
claim.
In sum, Arrow's Theorem is a powerful and important piece of social
science, but it does not prove all claims against legislative intent made in
its name. The result renders only a very limited set of normative
statements about CCR's impossible-even he called it a "General Possibility
Theorem." The proof does not show that any particular condition can
never be satisfied nor does it preclude "fair" decision making unless you
equate fairness with Arrow's short list of conditions. As described
above, the proof allows almost every combination of Arrow's conditions
to be achieved simultaneously for almost every possible preference
profile for any CCR. This is why reading any of the validated proofs of
Arrow's Theorem will quickly reveal that Arrow proved something far
short of the universal impossibilities often claimed in the Theorem's name.
IV. LOST IN APPLICATION: THE MAJORITY RULE INSTABILITY RESULTS
Other participants in statutory interpretation debates cite social choice
theory, but not Arrow's Theorem. They focus on social choice theory's
majority rule results. One such result is Condorcet's famous paradox.25
There are three alternatives, and the CCR is a two-stage agenda: Using
MMD, first pit two alternatives against each other and then put the
winner up against the third. Condorcet's paradox is as follows. Consider
the preference profile "individual I prefers x to y to z, 2 prefers y to z to
x, and 3 prefers z to x to y." If the MMD agenda is used "x versus y,
winner versus z" z is the winner because x beats y by 2 votes to I in the
first vote and z beats x by the same margin in the second vote. If,
however, a different agenda is used, a different winner emerges. The
paradox is that even though preferences remain constant, any alternative
can win-"x versus z, winner versus y" produces y as the winner and "y
versus z, winner versus x" makes x victorious. In other words, simply
manipulating the order in which alternatives are voted on is sufficient to
lead a majority to make contradictory choices. In an even more
disquieting result, McKelvey showed that social choices made by
24. Id.
25. MARQUIS DE CONDORCET, ESSAI SUR L'APPLICATION DE L'ANALYSE A LA
PROBABILTt DES DECISIONS RENDUES A LA PLURALITt DES Voix (1785).
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majority rule can become wildly unrepresentative of any voter's
preferences (i.e, he proved that a series of majority votes can result in
the selection of an alternative X instead of an alternative Y even though
all voters prefer Y to X).26
Such results have led scholars to conclude that "the choices of majorities
do not automatically display desirable normative principles"2 7 and that
the final outcome of legislative deliberations "may be arbitrary."28
Farber reports that they have also affected the legal literature and
judicial norms of statutory interpretation, "This seems to make it
questionable to say that any particular outcome reflects the preferences
of the legislators ... There is an inescapable chaos to collective decision
making-vox populi, it would seem, cannot carry a tune. 29
Do social choice theory's majority rule results prove that it is
impossible to draw meaningful inferences about collective intent from
majority decisions? To answer this question, we take a closer look at the
underlying scholarship.
The Condorcet and McKelvey results are part of a class of instability
results. Stability is an important concept in the study of social choice. It
refers to the relationship between individual preferences and collective
choices. If a set of individual preferences always yields a particular
collective choice, then the relationship between preferences and outcomes is
stable. If, however, a set of individual preferences corresponds to no
particular collective choice, then the relationship is unstable. Condorcet's
paradox, explained above, is an example of an unstable relationship-a
single preference profile yields three very different social choices.
When a preference-outcome relation is unstable, it can be difficult or
impossible to deduce what any individual or set of individuals wanted
from the choice that they made as a group. This is why instability
results appear useful to arguments against legislative intent-it is
difficult to assign intent to a collective that can produce very different
choices even though its members' preferences remain constant.
26. Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and
Some Implicationsfor Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).
27. William H. Riker & Barry W. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative
Choice: The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L.
REV. 373,386 (1988).
28. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It ": Legislative Intent as
Orvmoron, 12 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 239, 241-42 (1992).
29. Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1565, 1577 (1995).
A focal reference for scholars who attempt to tie the instability results
to legislative intent is a debate featuring Riker and Shepsle. In 1980,
Riker chose the term "disequilibrium" to describe the unstable relationship
between individual preferences and social choice. He concluded that
"Disequilibrium, or the potential that the status quo be upset, is the
characteristic feature of politics."30 He went on to argue that "politics is
the dismal science because we have learned from it that there are no
fundamental equilibria to predict. In the absence of such equilibria we
cannot know much about the future at all...31
Shepsle 32 and Shepsle and Weingast 33 counterargued that social choice
theory ignored the context in which actual social choices occur. They
then added a context of rules and procedure to the standard social choice
theory framework and found stable correspondences between preferences
and choices. They conclude that institutions induce stability. As Shepsle
states, "institutional structure-in the form of rules of jurisdiction and
amendment control-has an important independent impact on the existence
of equilibrium and, together with the distribution of preferences, co-
determines the characteristics of the equilibrium state(s) of collective
choice processes. 34 To Shepsle and Weingast, institutions induce stability
by reducing the number of elements in the decision makers' choice set.
35
With fewer items to choose from, there are fewer challengers to the policy
status quo and with fewer challengers, there is more stability. Thus, Shepsle
and Weingast answered Tullock's empirically-motivated question "Why so
much stability?"36 with the response "Institutional arrangements do it!",
37
30. William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for
the Study ofInstitutions, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 432, 443 (1980).
31. Id.
32. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional
Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 27 (1979).
33. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and
Legislative Choice, 37 PUBLIC CHOICE 503 (1981).
34. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in
Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. POL. SCI. 27, 29 (1979).
35. Shepsle defined a structure-induced equilibrium as an alternative that is
"invulnerable in the sense that no other alternative, allowed by the rules of procedure, is
preferred by all the individuals, structural units, and coalitions that possess distinctive
veto or voting power." Kenneth A. Shepsle, Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from
the Rational Choice Approach, I J. THEORETICAL POL. 131, 137 (1989). He has also
discussed some sources of institutional stability such as the high costs of change, but has
recognized that theorists have "just begun to tackle the problem of institutional
robustness." Id. at 143.
36. Gordon Tullock, Why So Much Stability, 37 PUBLIC CHOICE 189 (1981).
37. Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, Structure-Induced Equilibrium and
Legislative Choice, 37 PUBLIC CHOICE 503, 504 (1981).
[Vol. 14: 585, 2005] Lost in Translation
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY LEGAL ISSUES
Riker replied that groups choose institutions. He continued that if
institutional choice is but one example of collective choice, then institutional
choice is subject to all the same instability problems as collective choice
more generally. As Riker notes, "the losers are likely to want to change
the committees and jurisdictions in the hope of winning on another day.
In the end, therefore, institutions are no more than rules and rules are
themselves the product of social decisions. Consequently, the rules are
also not in equilibrium." 38
Put another way, people choose institutions and if they understand that
certain institutions correspond to certain collective choices, then the
choice of institutions can be just as unstable as any other collective
choice. Therefore, one cannot claim to have found a stable relationship
between preferences and choice if the institutions that are alleged to
induce stability are themselves the product of collective choice. Riker's
conclusion implies that the claim "Institutional arrangements do it" begs,
rather than answers, the question "Why so much stability?
39
We contend that instability is not as endemic as Riker alleges and we
shall support this conclusion in a manner that does not beg Riker's
38. William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for
the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 432, 444-45 (1980).
39. Other scholars, most notably Judith Sloss, Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule
Voting Games, 15 PUBLIC CHOICE 19 (1973), have used the transaction cost logic of R.H.
Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, THE
STRUCTURE AND CHANGE OF ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); and OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) to argue
that many institutional, jurisdictional, and partisan arrangements induce stability by
making change costly or impossible. Cf, John H. Aldrich, A Model of a Legislature with
Two Parties and a Committee System, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 313 (1994); Gary W. Cox &
Mathew D. McCubbins, Bonding, Structure, and the Stability of Political Parties: Party
Government in the House, 19 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 215 (1994); Douglass Dion, The Robustness of
the Structure-Induced Equilibrium, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 462 (1992); Gary J. Miller &
Thomas H. Hammond, Committees and the Core of the Constitution, 66 PUBLIC CHOICE
201 (1990); Peter C. Ordeshook, Political Disequilibrium and Scientific Inquiry: A
Comment on William Riker's "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for
the Study of Institutions ", 74 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 447 (1980); Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (1985); Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium in Institutions, in POLITICAL SCIENCE:
THE SCIENCE OF POLITICS 51 (Herbert Weisberg ed., 1986); Gordon Tullock, Why No
Cycles, 28 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 1 (2000); Barry R. Weingast & William J. Marshall, The
Industrial Organization of Congress, 96 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 132
(1988). However, each of these arrangements is, itself, a product of collective choice.
So, such arguments, while compelling for other reasons, do not escape Riker's
counterargument.
question. Moreover, to the extent that analysts equate instability and the
impossibility of legislative intent, our argument brings the possibility of
legislative intent back to life. We begin by accepting Riker's key
premise: if one wants to claim that a particular relationship between
individual preferences and collective choices is stable, then the origin of
social choice stability must be out of the reach of human manipulation. It
must be exogenous-the stability cannot be the product of another
collective choice. To this end, we introduce the notion that certain
exogenous forces, such as systematic and universal limits on human
energy, cognition, and communicative ability, may bring about stability
because they impose high costs on individuals and groups who may
otherwise have an incentive to change a social choice.
Our main finding in this section reengages Riker and Shepsle's debate
about the origins of stability. Riker, in his counterargument to Shepsle,
assumes that all of the means for inducing stability are endogenous; that
is, they are all prior choices made by the collectivity itself. By contrast,
we argue that systematic, universal, and exogenous forces of nature
drain people of their desire or ability to destabilize standing social
decisions. We then find that disequilibrium, or the potential that the
status quo be upset, is not the characteristic feature of politics-even in
the absence of institutions. As a result, we conclude that social choice
theory's instability results are not sufficient to prove that the
impossibility of legislative intent.
We proceed as follows. First, we provide concepts and notation
essential to understanding just what the instability results prove. Then,
we amend the social choice framework to incorporate some of the
exogenous forces described above. In each case, the force yields
stability.
A. The Basic Framework of Social Choice Theory
There are three basic elements of any social choice problem: the set of
alternatives (e.g., {x,y,z} eS), the set of individual preferences, and the
collective choice rule.40 Because social choice theory is a branch of
40. In what follows, we present only the elements of social choice theory that are
necessary to make our point about stability. See KENNETH, J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE
AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); AMARTYA SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL
WELFARE 1-20 (1970); KOTARO SUZUMURA, RATIONAL CHOICE, COLLECTIVE DECISIONS,
AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1983); THOMAS SCHWARTZ, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE CHOICE
(1986); and HERVE MOULIN, AXIOMS OF COOPERATIVE DECISION MAKING (1988) for
more thorough treatments. Also note that choice sets, the typical output of a collective
choice rule, can have more than one element. To simplify the exposition, we describe
examples whose choice sets have only one element.
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cooperative game theory, the alternatives are treated as common knowledge
endstates. That is all players base their votes on the knowledge that if the
group chooses alternative x, then x will be the sole determinant of each
person's well being. Treating alternatives as endstates allows us to place
them into preference orderings and preference profiles. As mentioned in
the section on Arrow's Theorem, a collective choice rule translates the
set of individual preference orderings, and the preference profile P, into
a collective choice.
So, when is a collective choice xeS stable? Let D(g, x, y) refer to
alternatives x eS and y eS and a group of individuals, g, who, once x is
chosen, together have the ability and desire to overturn x in favor of y.
Whether these individuals gain their power from a previously chosen
CCR or the state of nature is irrelevant. Then, let yDx mean that D(g, x,
y) holds for some group g. Then x eS is stable if and only if there is no
y eS for which yDx.4 1 So, given an MMD agenda of the form "x versus y,
winner versus z," we say that an outcome x is stable if no such agenda
yields a different outcome. If, by contrast, we re-introduce the preference
profile of Condorcet's paradox42 then there is no stable outcome. This is
so because any alternative can lose a majority vote to one of the other
alternatives-x can lose to z, z can lose to y, and y can lose to x.
The basic elements just described are the foundation of social choice
theory's most famous instability results.43 Take, for example, McKelvey's
result, which is derived from a standard spatial model of policy choice.
In it, a group of individuals chooses from a set of alternatives, where
each alternative is defined as a point in the two-dimensional space S.
41. This definition, and the language that motivates it, follows THOMAS SCHWARTZ,
THE MEANING OF INSTABILITY 13-14 (1986) (typescript: University of Texas).
42. See supra note 25.
43. E.g., C.L. DODGSON, A METHOD OF TAKING VOTES ON MORE THAN Two ISSUES
(1876); E. J. Nanson, Methods of Election, 18 TRANSACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ROYAL SOCIETY OF VICTORIA 197 (1882); William H. Riker, Voting and the Summation
of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographic Review of Selected Developments during
the Last Decade, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 900 (1961); Charles R. Plott, A Notion of
Equilibrium and Its Possibility Under Majority Rule, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 787 (1967); Thomas
Schwartz, Votes, Strategies, and Institutions: An Introduction to the Theory of Collective
Choice, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY (Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan
eds., 1987); Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models
and Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976); Linda Cohen,
Cyclical Sets in Multidimensional Voting Models, 20 J. ECON. THEORY 1 (1979); Norman
Schofield, Generic Instability of Majority Rule, 50 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 695
(1983).
Individual preferences are also represented by ideal points in this space.
When the exogenous agenda setter in McKelvey's model proposes that
the group hold a vote on whether to change policy, the group does so
without hesitation. Each individual can vote for the status quo (hereafter,
q), or an alternative (hereafter, x) and chooses whichever of q or x is
closest to her ideal point. The majority winner becomes the status quo
and the sequence begins again. In such environs, McKelvey proves that
if enough votes are taken, an agenda can be constructed in which any
point in S can win a majority vote-including alternatives that are very
far from all voters' ideal points. This result, moreover, is achieved
without altering a single voter's preferences-which makes it a classic
instability result.
However, models such as this not only "stack the deck" towards
instability (rather than stability) results; they also complicate attempts to
export the results to real voting contexts. In them, the only barrier to
moving from one collective choice to another is that the challenging
alternative be a possible outcome of the CCR. There are no difficulties
involved in "holding another vote" or "implementing a different policy."
These models include no scarcity of the type that makes holding another
vote or implementing a new policy expensive.44 These models also
assume that all individuals choose as if all of the alternatives have
welfare-enhancing properties of all the alternatives. There is no complexity
to make people uncertain about the consequences of their actions or
hesitant about change.
Given these assumptions, it is not at all surprising that the theories in
question produce instability results-these theories assume that change
is free and easy. Or, as Easterbrook argues:
Perhaps... the problem inheres in a model in which actors try to maximize
something (the achievement of their own objectives) but in which there are no
scarcities. What is the constraint? How does a need to conserve on some scarce
good drive people to an equilibrium?... Information is one candidate for scarcity.
Time is another .... 45
He concludes that the literature cited above "needs a theory of scarcity."46
We agree. Scarcity and uncertainty are our constant companions; they are
ubiquitous features of the human existence. Scarcity in human time, energy,
and ability makes change anything but free. And uncertainty, which implies
44. A notable exception to this practice is Judith Sloss, Stable Outcomes in
Majority Rule Voting Games, 15 PUBLIC CHOICE 19 (1973). We discuss the relationship
between her approach and our own later in the paper.
45. Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of
Public Choice, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 285 (1992).
46. Id. at 286.
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that we cannot know the consequences of our actions, may drain us of
the desire for change.
Indeed, to destabilize a standing social decision, a group of individuals
must have both the ability and the desire to force a change. Scarcity and
uncertainty can drain them of both. When scarcity and uncertainty are
the product of exogenous forces and induce people to stick with
particular choices, they induce stability. Moreover, these forces shape
the ways people think about what they are doing. Therefore, they help to
define people's intent. And when scarcity and uncertainty have common
influences on a group of people, important aspects of their intent may be
shared. Therefore, when scarcity and uncertainty induce stability, it is
not impossible to conclude that the social choice is a product of
collective intent.
B. Increasing Social Choice Theory's Applicability
We now propose three amendments to the class of models described
above. Each one incorporates exogenous forces of nature-forces that
engender the scarcity and uncertainty described above-into social
choice theory's logical structure.
1. Amendment: Include Exogenous Decision Costs and
Give the Status Quo Special Treatment
Changing policy requires time and effort. Time and effort are scarce.
Opinions must be gathered, strategies must be expressed, proposals must
be written and collected, and votes must be held. More important,
attempting to change one policy may entail the payment of substantial
opportunity costs-the forfeited opportunity to do something else. When
such costs are considered, changing some policy may require more time
and effort than a collectivity can muster.
Exogenous forces (i.e., nature) create some of these costs-in effect
influencing the amount of effort that certain changes require and restricting
the range of activities in which people can engage. For example, humans
have limited perceptual capabilities (i.e., eyes that can see only so far,
ears that can hear only so much).47 Decision making also requires attention,
which, in turn, requires energy (e.g., you cannot read this article or pay
47. See also Herbert A. Simon, Theories of Decision-Making in Economics and
Behavioral Science, 49 AM. ECON. REv. 253 (1959); HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF
THOUGHT (1979).
attention to what a friend is saying without exerting effort). Limited
perception and limited energy combine to make certain prerequisites for
policy change (e.g., attention to complicated alternatives) costly or
impossible. For example, we sometimes ignore new ideas, even when
their adoption may be beneficial-because we are too distracted by other
things. Moreover, limits in the human ability to communicate and receive
communication make some ideas difficult or impossible to express, as
writers who attempt to make technical arguments to non-technical
audiences understand well.
Even when people are paying attention and the ideas implicit in a
policy change can be expressed, collective decisions often require
additional effort. For example, a person who wants to challenge the
status quo may have to persuade others that accepting the proposal is
better than staying with the status quo. As psychologists, economists,
and political scientists know, however, persuasion is often difficult and
sometimes impossible."a
Together, limited energy, limited perception, cognitive processing
limits (e.g., memory) and the difficulties inherent in communication and
persuasion increase the costs of many forms of policy change and make
some forms of policy change impossible. To put these ideas into the
language of social choice theory, let Pi be the part of preference profile
P that pertains to an individual i's preferences. Let Ki be individual i's
exogenous decision costs-the personal cost of participating in a single
attempt to challenge some aspect of the status quo. 9 Let P(K) be the
preference profile after everyone's decision costs are introduced and let
Pi(Ki) be the part of this profile that pertains to individual i.
We demonstrate the effects of such costs on a collective choice in a
series of figures. In the figures, the status quo, q, is the endstate that
occurs if the collectivity does not choose a new policy. So, unlike all of
the other alternatives from which the collectivity may choose, only q can
48. Each discipline's line of argument identifies situational factors or attributes of
those doing the talking (e.g., a reputation for telling the truth) that make persuasion
costly or impossible. See ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBNs, THE DEMOCRATIC
DILEMMA 17-64 (1988), for a review of these arguments.
49. We subscript these costs with the letter i to denote the fact that decision costs
can vary across individuals. This move allows us to incorporate such costs without
committing to a cardinal utility scheme and interpersonal comparability of utility.
Avoiding such a commitment is important, as a central tenet of social choice theory is to
make positive, rather than normative, judgments about the relative needs of individuals.
Of course, these costs can also vary across decision rules, vary across the aspects of the
status quo being challenged, or be the object of uncertainty themselves. While incorporating
these variations would reinforce the main theme of our argument, we exclude them here
to simplify the exposition.
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be achieved without incurring any costs.
Now let there be three legislators, A, B, and C, who are considering a
new policy to replace q. The circles in each figure labeled IA(q[KA), IB(qIKB), and
Ic(qlKc), are a function of Pi(Kd) and represent the legislators' preferences
with respect to q, given each legislator i's decision costs, Ki. That is, the area
inside a circle represents all of the policies in the space that the legislator
named prefers to the status quo (In Figure 1, these circles include all the
points in the space that are closer to her ideal point than q).
In Figure 1, costs are zero for all legislators. The shaded area represents
the set of policies that can defeat q in a majority vote. Thus, x will defeat q
in a simple, binary, majority vote, while y will not. This figure represents
the models cited above well-costs are assumed to be zero and the
shaded area is a breeding ground for the instability results described
earlier in this section.
FIGURE 1
WIN SET OF 1 (SHADED) WITH NO COSTS
Ic(qIKc=0)
IA(qIKA=0)
In Figure 2, we add exogenous decision costs. Legislator A faces a
cost of 4-qI/4 to change policy, while legislator B faces a cost of [B-q[/2.
In comparison to Figure 1, the shaded area-the set of policies that can
beat q in a majority vote shrinks considerably. This set now contains
only policy choices acceptable to legislators A and C. The kinds of
instability identified by Condorcet and McKelvey are more difficult to
accomplish in such settings because there are no feasible policy changes
that benefit legislator B.
FIGURE 2
REDUCTION IN WIN SET WHEN A FACES COST
/A-q//4 AND B FACES COST /B-q//2
I(QJK =0)
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In Figure 3, we increase legislator A's cost threefold, to 3A-ql/4. This
change yields no shaded area, making q stable with respect to individual
preferences in this context. Since the costs are exogenous, voters' individual
and collective best move is to stick with the status quo. In a world
without costs, they might want to choose something different, but -like
real legislators-no voter in this model lives in such a costless world. In
the context in which they must actually choose, all share a rationale for
sticking with the status quo-the costs of changing policy outweigh the
benefits for all. There is, therefore, at least a degree of shared intent-all
agree that change is not worthwhile.
FIGURE 3
EMPTY WIN SET AS A'S COST INCREASES TO 31A-ql/4
C. Amendment: Include Exogenous Implementation Costs
Making a decision and realizing its benefits are not always the same
thing. Additional work is often required to get from legislation to
implementation.50 For example, we may collectively decide to send
astronauts to Mars, but it will cost hundreds of billions of dollars and
decades of work to implement this decision. We may declare a war on
cancer and vow to win it by this decade's end, but our limited knowledge
may render victory elusive no matter how much time, money, and
attention we invest. Implementation is no trivial matter.51 While many
factors can make implementation costly, we focus on exogenous factors.
To illustrate how such costs affect stability, consider an example
where each alternative in S is represented as a point on a surface in a
three dimensional space. The surface is not flat; it is flush with hills and
valleys. We then place a group of decision-makers at a point on this
surface, and we call this point the status quo, q. We assume that the
group can move to other locations only "as a group." The group uses
MMD to determine whether and where to move.
Let the costs of implementation be determined by the contours of the
terrain across which the group moves. In other words, the group must
expend energy to climb up and down hills. The higher or steeper the
climb, the more costly it is for group members to "implement" a "higher"
endstate. The steeper the grade, or the more difficult the climbing surface,
the more energy movement requires. Moreover, natural obstacles, such
as cliffs, glaciers, or oceans, make moving in certain directions impossible.
If exogenous forces make implementation sufficiently difficult or
costly, then it can make unattractive alternatives that would be desirable
if implementation were free. Suppose, for example, that if movement
were costless, every member of the expedition would prefer to be at a
higher altitude. Suppose further that each person is able to contribute
only so much energy to the group's climbing effort. Then, the set of
moves that are feasible is limited to those that are humanly possible and
for which the benefits of moving to a higher altitude outweigh the costs
of contributing to the group's climbing effort for a majority of the group.
50. See, e.g., ROGER NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (1971); JEFFREY PRESSMAN &
AARON WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION (1973); PAUL A. SABATIER & DANIEL B. MAZMANIAN,
CAN REGULATION WORK? (1983); THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (James Q. Wilson ed.,
1980).
51. See, e.g., Thomas R. Palfrey, Implementation in Bayesian Equilibrium: the
Multiple Equilibirum Problem in Mechanism Design, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY
VOL. 1, at 283 (Jean-Jaques Laffont ed., 1992); JEAN-JAQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A
THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION (1993).
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As was the case in Figures 1-3 above, incorporating implementation
costs can restrict the size of the set of proposals that can beat q-perhaps
even decreasing its size to zero, which would ensure stability.
So even if everyone in the group agrees that it would be great to live
in a world where moving to higher endstates is costless, the context in
which they actually make decisions-one where exogenous forces make
implementation costly-can unify their intent. They may even choose to
camp on a hilltop in the shadow of a mountain upon whose top they
would all wish to perch if movement were free. Though change is
theoretically possible for this group, it chooses stability.
D. Discussion of a Related Argument
Our first two amendments involve the addition of exogenously
determined costs to the social choice framework. In a sense, they echo
Sloss (1973).52 She argues that there is "a 'cost of transition' involved in
changing from one social state to another"5 3 and concludes that "[t]he
presence of decision costs in a majority rule voting situation increases
the likelihood that a stable outcome will exist."54 Our argument differs
from Sloss' in at least two ways.
First, Sloss is silent about where costs come from. She notes that "it
costs an individual something-in time, effort, or money-to engage in
the process of coalition-formation necessary to change the status quo,"55
but this is the extent of her explanation. By contrast, where costs come
from is a critical part of our argument (and of Riker's critique). For
Riker, stability-inducing costs were the product of institutions; for us,
they are the consequence of exogenous forces.
Second, we differ in how costs affect preferences. Sloss treats costs as
separable from the value of achieving a different social outcome. As a
result, she considers decision costs capable of making player utility
functions non-differentiable and individual preferences intransitive. We
argue that decision costs should not be separated from the value of
achieving a different social outcome when they are a necessary condition
for achieving the outcome.
We also contend that a decision-maker's preferences over alternate
52. Judith Sloss, Stable Outcomes in Majority Rule Voting Games, 15 PUBLIC
CHOICE 19 (1973).
53. Id. at 21 n.4.
54. Id. at 42.
55. Id. at 21.
locations in the space of alternatives need not be independent of his or
her current location in that space. This is why our amended social choice
theory allows change to be costly and reserves special treatment for the
status quo-it can be achieved with no decision costs. In sum, when
characterizing individual preferences in social choice theories, we argue
that the costs of change should be explicitly integrated into the pre-
decision value of endstates whose realizations require change, particularly
when the costs are a consequence of exogenous forces. Clearly, such
costs often induce people to prefer stability over change and can unify
participants' intent in decision contexts where such costs loom large.
E. Amendment: Include Uncertainty
In most collective choice contexts, individuals lack information about
the consequences of their actions. In some cases, limited information
induces stability by reducing the number of alternatives to the status quo
of which people are aware. In other cases, information effects are more
subtle. If people are risk averse, then limited information can make them
apprehensive about trying new things56 and effectively limit the number
of alternatives that an individual or group is willing to consider. Such
effects can bind people to certain outcomes and induce stability in places
where it would not exist if everyone were omniscient.
Returning to the mountainous expedition described earlier, limited
information is analogous to limited vision--each individual's perceptive
capacity interacts with the topography of the location to limit the number
of alternative locations she can see. A person standing at the foot of a
mountain may be unable to see beyond it to possibly higher distant
peaks. Her limited vision may make her uncertain about the work needed
to reach a higher endstate and, if movement is costly, may dissuade her
from moving. Clouds, fog, and the horizon may have similar effects-
they prevent people from seeing higher mountaintops, even if loftier
peaks are close by and easy to reach in reality.57
To put this idea into the lexicon of social choice theory, let the matrix
I be the "information profile." An information profile specifies what
each individual knows about the post-implementation (endstate) value of
each policy alternative. Each row of the matrix corresponds to an
individual; each column corresponds to an alternative. Therefore each
element of the profile represents what a particular person knows about a
56. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames,
39 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984).
57. And even if everyone in the group can see a higher mountaintop and would
rather be there if movement were free and easy, their limited vision can be the basis of an
implementation cost if it prevents them from seeing "how to get to there from here."
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particular alternative. We assume that the perceived value of an endstate
is a function of information. Let P() be the profile of individual
preferences over alternatives in S given information I.
To see the impact of uncertainty, consider Table 1. It presents two
preference profiles, one is the complete information profile f and the
other is the incomplete information profile f. Let x be the sole subject of
uncertainty in information profile P and suppose that voters are so averse
to uncertainty that x drops to the bottom of their respective preference
orderings. Given MMD as the CCR, the uncertainty is sufficient to
induce stability in the example. The complete information case yields
Condorcet's paradox. The incomplete information case, by contrast,
yields stability: no alternative can defeat y (as legislators 1 and 2 now
prefer y to z and x).
TABLE 1
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND RISK AVERSION
TOGETHER INDUCE STABILITY
1 2 3 _ _ 1 2 3
x y z y -y z
y z x z z y
z x y x x x
Individual information shortcomings can affect group decisions in
other ways. As suggested by research in psychology,58 economics,59 and
political science,6" information asymmetries limit what people are
willing to say to each other and what listeners are willing to believe. For
example, when a speaker fears that a particular utterance will offend her
58. See, e.g., RICHARD E. PETTY & JOHN T. CACIOPPO, COMMUNICATION AND
PERSUASION: CENTRAL AND PERIPHERAL ROUTES TO ATTITUDE CHANGE (1986); ALICE H.
EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES (1993).
59. See, e.g., Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL
OF ECONOMICS 355 (1973); Vincent P. Crawford & Joel Sobel, Strategic Information
Transmission, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1431 (1982); Joseph Farrell & Robert Gibbons, Straight
Talk with Two Audiences, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1214 (1989).
60. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Banks, SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1991);
ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA (1988).
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audience or turn them against her she may fail to provide information
that would actually help them. In such cases, information asymmetries
limit the number of alternatives that members of collectivities can convince
each other to consider. Put another way, and returning to the mountains
for one final example, one person with exceptional vision may be able to
see mountaintops that no one else can see. If that person lacks the ability
to persuade the others of the mountaintop's existence, then movement to
those mountaintops will not occur. An appendix contains an additional,
though more involved, example, that shows how exogenous costs and
information effects combine to limit the instability in the McKelvey
model.61
F. Main Implication
Our amendments clarify how exogenous forces affect the social choice
instability results. They make policy change costly and the consequences of
such changes uncertain. When considered together they are powerful and
often induce stability.
That such forces are strong and ever present in our lives explains why
when we examine the collective choices that do or can affect our lives,
instability never seems to be the problem 62 -the problem is actually
getting something done.63 Limited cognitive ability, the difficulty of
persuasion, decision costs and other exogenous factors each reinforce
what we call Newton's First Law of Social Choice: It is easier for groups
to stay where they are than it is for them to move. These forces induce
group members to share the intention of leaving things as they are.
This way of thinking leads us to disagree with Riker's claim that "in
the long run, nearly anything can happen in politics."64 Riker's conclusion
ignores the fact that tendencies in what humans can perceive, systematic
limits on persuasion, and propensity to fear the unknown generates
preferences for certain types of outcomes-particularly the status quo.
While nearly anything can happen in social choice theory's models of
politics, it is wrong to draw the same conclusion about existing legislative
domains. There, 'disequilibrium' is not the characteristic feature of
politics.
61. Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and
Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472 (1976).
62. See Gordon Tullock, Why So Much Stability, 37 PUBLIC CHOICE 189 (1981).
63. E.g., MANCUR OLSEN JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS
AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
64. William H. Riker, Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for
the Study of Institutions, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 432, 446 (1980).
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V. CONCLUSION
Neither Arrow's General Possibility Theorem nor the focal instability
results of social choice theory is sufficient to prove that legislative intent
is meaningless or does not exist. To claim that it does is to misunderstand or
misinterpret the results.
The results do, however, provide warnings about blithely accepting
general normative claims about collective choices. Arrow's Theorem
precludes a select set of universal claims about what qualities a method
of collective choice can have. The instability results identify certain
theoretical conditions under which instability will be rampant. Such
points are beyond disagreement. But there is an important difference
between demonstrating that some claims about collective intent are
logically incoherent-which the social choice results do--and demonstrating
that all such claims are meaningless. For this latter task, the social choice
results are insufficient or-as Thomas Schwartz once concluded about
the instability results: "[w]hat you have seen so far is not that collective
choices are always unstable, or even that they are ever unstable, but only
that they can be unstable."
65
Having demonstrated that Arrow's Theorem and the instability results
do not negate legislative intent, what can we say about statutory interpretation
more generally? We hope that readers come away from this article with
the understanding that the answer to this question requires insights that
social choice theory is ill equipped to offer. Because cooperative game
theory does not allow us to draw precise conclusions about how and why
individuals adapt to the exogenous forces and actions of others that
characterize real choice contexts, it provides a weak foundation for
answering questions about intentionality-individual or collective.
Non-cooperative game theory offers a better logical foundation. It
allows analysts to draw clearer causal connections between what people
want and what they do when they are able to adapt strategically to
adverse conditions in their environment. Scholars, such as Shepsle66 and
McCubbins and Rodriguez, 67 have begun to incorporate such insights
65. Thomas Schwartz, Votes, Strategies, and Institutions: An Introduction to the
Theory of Collective Choice, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 329 (Mathew D.
McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987).
66. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They" Not an "It ": Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 239 (1992).
67. Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Theories of Law and Statutory
Interpretation, WHAT STATUTES MEAN (Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez
into their contributions to the legislative intent debate.
In addition to logic, questions about intent should also have an empirical
reference-after all, intentionality refers to a mental state. Clarifying the
conditions under which scholars can draw reliable inferences about individual
or collective intent requires knowledge of not only the relationship
between individual thought and action but also about how these factors
correspond to common thoughts and intentions that a group can share.
Since it is possible for individuals to share beliefs and preferences in
common, the idea that an analyst can draw a reliable inference about
collective intent is less easily dismissed than many critics allege.
Our continuing work in this area68 builds from an integrated foundation
of non-cooperative game theory and relevant research lines in psychology.
In it, we are identifying conditions under which reliable inferences about
legislative intent and the meaning of statutes can be drawn.
eds., 2004).
68. Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Can Legislative Records Aid
Statutory Interpretation? Inference, Credibility, and Collective Intent in the United States
Congress, in WHAT STATUTES MEAN (Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez
eds., 2004).
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VI. APPENDIX
COSTS, UNCERTAINTY, AND MCKELVEY'S
GLOBAL CYCLING THEOREM
In a classic 1976 article, McKelvey proved that:
[Iln the case where all voters evaluate policy in terms of a Euclidean metric, if
there is no equilibrium outcome, then the intransitivities extend to the whole
policy space in such a way that all points are in the same cycle set. The theoretical
implication of this result is that it is theoretically possible to design voting
procedures which, starting from any given point, will end up at any other point in
the space of alternatives, even at Pareto dominated ones.
6 9
McKelvey derived his result from a standard spatial model. As noted in
the text, a characteristic of such models is that they portray collective
choice as occuring in the absence of decision costs, implementation
costs, and uncertainty.
What happens to McKelvey's main result-that MMD can lead to a
majority supporting any point in the choice space regardless of how
large the distance between that point and their ideal points-if we
incorporate these factors into the standard model? A simple, but
suggestive example answers the question.
Our example is based on McKelvey's model, with two notable differences.
The first difference concerns the number of voters and policy dimensions.
McKelvey proves his theorem for n voters and m policy dimensions,
where both n and m are finite. Our demonstration involves 3 voters, 2
policy dimensions, and 1 cost-related dimension. Our simplification entails
no loss of generality (i.e., it is easy to replicate in higher dimensional
spaces). The second difference is that we introduce implementation
costs and voter uncertainty.
There are three voters V = (VI, v2, v3}. The voters use majority rule to
choose points on S, a three-dimensional Euclidean surface, S = .'. We
call the first dimension x EN1', the second dimension y e9, and the third
dimension c e9. We call alternatives in S Sq, S1, S2, . . . sn, where the
subscript q denotes the status quo and the other subscripts denote the
order in which the alternatives are voted on. So, if there is a first vote,
then it is between Sq and sl; if there is a second vote, then it is between S2
69. Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and
Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472 (1976).
and the winner of the first vote, and so on. Let nE(1 ..f., N}, where N is
finite, denote the number of the vote. For n > 1, let w, eS denote the
winner of the n1h vote and let wn_1 eS denote the winner of the n-11h vote.
For n=, let wn_ =Sq.
Like McKelvey, we assume that each voter has a policy utility function
Ui: S--7, that is a monotone decreasing function of Euclidean distance;
i.e., for all vi eV, and n e{O... N}, 3 w,, eS such that Ui(w,) = - #wn - Vill,
where 11'11 represents the standard Euclidean norm. Note that, in a
moment, we will offer a more comprehensive utility function that factors
in implementation costs and uncertainty.
Let c e91', which is the name of the third dimension in S, represent
implementation costs. Here, the implementation cost is a function of the
change on the x-dimension that occurs as a consequence of the election
result. For n > 1, let x, denote the location on the x-axis of the winner of
the n h vote and let x,_- denote the location on the x-axis of the winner of
the n-iph vote. For n= 1, let x,- I be the location of sq on the x-axis. Then,
for any election n, c = /x, - x"_/.
Put another way, S is the standard two-dimensional Euclidean plane
folded along the y-axis with movements away from x=O, in either the
positive or negative direction, implying an increase in horizontal and
vertical distance from x=O. This representation of the policy space
implies that climbing up or down the x-axis is equally costly and that the
only moves that are free to implement are moves along lines that are
parallel to the y-axis.
Now we add uncertainty. There are many ways in which this can be
done. We choose a simple one. Let Ze{1, Z} represent the unknown
factors associated with the cost of implementation, let Zh>l be a
multiplier relevant to a scenario where the implementation costs are
higher than c, and let z efO, 1] be the common prior probability that
Z=Zh>I. In other words, we assume that all individuals believe that
there is a chance (z) that implementing a new policy will cause
unexpected problems Zh.
Then Ui(wc, z, Zh) is voter i's total utility function, whose component
parts are his or her policy utility, the implementation costs required to
move from one point in S to another, and his or her uncertainty. In other
words, for each voter at each vote n, there is a total utility function
CCU: S---, which for all vi eV, 3 {w,-,, w,} eSxS such that the expected
utility from changing the status quo is - //s, - Vill- [(J-z)c ] - [zZ'7 c] and the
utility from retaining the status quo is= -//, - Vi/.
Like McKelvey, we follow the cooperative game theoretic norm of
assuming that voters vote sincerely. Here, this assumption implies that
every time voters are asked to vote, they select from the set of alternatives
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offered to them {s,, w,. 1} the element that corresponds to their highest
total utility. An implication of this assumption is that voters are myopic,
in that they do not look beyond the consequences of the current vote
when deciding what do to. We contend that allowing voters to think
about future implications of their current actions could also induce
stability, but we preserve this assumption in the example to make the
effect of costs and uncertainty on the McKelvey model simple and clear.
Using policy utility functions, McKelvey shows that "it is theoretically
possible to design voting procedures which, starting from any given
point, will end up at any other point in the space of alternatives, even at
Pareto dominated ones. 7 ° Our example shows why the same need not be
true for total utility functions.
Let Sq= (0,0), vt=(-2,0), v2=(0,2) ,and V3 =(2,0). Then the policy utility
and the total utility from Sq for each voter are -2. Suppose further that
S = {S - (-1.9, -1.9), s2=(0.5, 3.8), S3=(0.6, -3.7)} and that, for the
moment, z=O. Considering policy utility only, Table A-1 reveals the
McKelvey result-the group attains a Pareto dominated outcome (Sq
Pareto dominates s3) in just three votes. Asterisks in Table 1 denote the
individuals for whom s, provides higher policy utility than s,,.
TABLE A- I
Policy Utility Policy Utility Policy Utility Policy Utility
from sq from s, from S2 from S3
V, -2 -1.9* -4.55 -4.52*
V2  -2 -1.9* -1.87* -5.73
V3  -2 -4.34 4.08* -3.92*
Table A-2 displays the same situation inclusive of implementation
costs. Asterisks in Table 2 denote the individuals for whom w, provides
higher total utility than w,--but there are no asterisks. The
implementation costs in this example are sufficient to protect the status
quo policy from many challenges. In fact, an implementation cost of just
greater than. 1 is sufficient to prevent any element of S from defeating Sq
in this example.
70. Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and
Some Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472 (1976).
TABLE A-2
CC Utility CC Utility CC Utility CC Utility
from sq at n= from s, at n= from s2 at n=2 from s3 at n=3
V, -2 -3.8 -5.05 -4.82
V2  -2 -3.8 -2.37 -6.33
V3  -2 -6.24 -4.58 -4.52
In our example so far, S has only three elements. What happens if we
allow, just as McKelvey does, an exogenous agenda setter to choose, as
Sn, any point on the xy surface? Applying the Pythagorean theorem
shows that the lowest amount of policy utility that the player with the
highest policy utility could earn as the result of a majority decision to
move from sq to any other point on the xy surface is -42. Therefore,
any implementation cost of greater than 2 - F,2 is sufficient to prevent
any point on the xy-surface from defeating Sq in a majority vote. This
cost is not very high relative to the payoffs in Table A-2.
If we add uncertainty to the example, then the minimum implementation
cost sufficient to induce stability falls even more. Suppose that Z=J in
reality (i.e., the "bad implementation scenario", Z, will not be realized).
The only difference between this and the previous paragraph is voter
uncertainty-the objective situation is no different. With this uncertainty
the I9_west implementation cost sufficient to induce stability shrinks from
2 -42 to just above 0. To see why, note that the possible range of prior
beliefs that support the reality Z=1 is ze[O, 1). In other words, the
voters are concerned about the "bad implementation scenario," though
after the election they will learn that their fears were unfounded. In this
case, the minimum implementation cost required to protect Sq is now:
((1 - z)c) + zcZ
So as z or Zh increases, the minimum implementation cost required to
protect Sq from all challenges falls. And as long as c >0, there exist
values of z and Zt sufficient to induce stability. Put another way, as c or
Zh increases, the minimum amount of uncertainty that is sufficient to
induce stability decreases. Stated differently, even the smallest amount
of uncertainty can induce stability.
We are not, however, arguing that McKelvey's claim is untrue. His
argument is logically coherent. We are, however, arguing against other
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scholars' claims that McKelvey's result is directly relevant to debates
about legislative intent. To believe such conclusions applicable to debates
about legislative intent, one must also believe that the assumptions on
which McKelvey's result is based (i.e., policy change entails no uncertainty
or implementation costs) are true for actual legislative contexts or that the
assumptions are false, but his result holds nevertheless. The former is
ridiculous and the latter we have just shown to be false.
